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ABSTRACT 
This paper draws on a case study of Hamilton steelwork families to examine how the neo-conservative agenda is incorporated and resisted 
in a specific, historically constituted locality. Here the local conditions of capital led to strong labour movement and relatively good pay 
permitting the emergence of the breadwinner family. It is argued that these factors affect the ways in which new right ideology and 
feminism are apprehended and incorporated into local culture. 
RESUME 
Cet expose se base sur un cas d'etude de families de travailleurs d'acidrie d'Hamilton pour dtudier comment le programme n6o-
conservateur est incorpore' et comment on y resiste dans une localit6 qui a ix& constitute historiquement.Ici les conditions locales du capital 
ont mend a un mouvement de travailleurs fort et une paye relativement bonne qui a engendrd la famille qui a un soutien. On dit que ces 
facteurs influencent la facon dont la nouvelle ideologie de droite et le feminisme sont percues et incorpordes dans la culture locale. 
INTRODUCTION 
Four years into the term of the first New 
Democratic Party (NDP) government, the summer of 
1994 was one of discontent in Ontario politics. 
Headlines in the Hamilton Spectator reflected the hot 
issues in the news: 
NDP Staffers Bailing Out - Privately many MPPs 
concede electoral defeat (June 6 A5) 
Rae softens Stand on Same Sex Proposal (June 8 A1) 
Job Equity Law Will Hurt White Males (May 24 B1) 
When an election was called the following spring all 
the major parties agreed that deficit reduction and job 
creation were priorities. On what at first glance is an 
unrelated issue, each party declared that i f elected 
they would not pursue spousal rights for same sex 
couples. 
The election in June 1995 of a Progressive 
Conservative (PC) government, committed to cutting 
welfare programmes, slashing personal and corporate 
taxes and abolishing the pro-labour legislation 
enacted by the previous administration, follows 
similar swings to the Right in other western industrial 
countries. It is my contention here that these 
electoral victories, together with the dominant issues 
which shaped campaign agendas, signal the success 
of the neoconservative Right' in naturalizing its 
agenda. 
The economic project of neoconservatism is 
to free the market from state intervention, break 
down the social contract between the state, labour and 
capital, and allow capital to move freely. Wallerstein 
argues that purely economic policy measures are 
insufficient to meet this goal and that the terrain on 
which this project will be accomplished is culture, the 
"ideological battleground of the modern world-
system" (Wallerstein 1990:39). Wallerstein implies a 
conceptual opposition between culture and economy, 
yet social reality comprises a complex set of 
arrangements in which each is closely implicated in 
the workings of the other. My position here is that the 
success of the neoconservative economic agenda and 
the New Right social and political one, depends not 
only on establishing new forms of hegemony in the 
sphere popularly called "the economy". It also 
depends on establishing a particular hegemonic 
concept of reality in the sphere of the family. While 
it is commonly held that it is "the economy" which is 
being restructured, in fact all aspects of society are 
targets for transformation. As this happens, older, 
historically grounded and apparently stable identities 
are contested, shifting the ground on which gender, 
work, family 2, class and political identities are 
constructed. 
This paper stresses the complementarity of 
the restructuring processes affecting work and the 
family, and mediated by the state, through a case 
study of Hamilton steelworker families,3 following 
the manifestations of these processes among people 
in an historically constituted locality. My focus here 
is the everyday nature of the cultural battles 
Wallerstein refers to, the way that the 
neoconservative agenda is incorporated into a 
specific local context and articulates with local 
culture. 
FAMILIALISM AND THE MARKET OVER 
FEMINISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 
In their study of the New Right and family 
in Britain and the United States, Abbott and Wallace 
(1992:19) argue that late 20th century New Right 
thinking draws on the late 18th century conservatives, 
who while promoting laissez-faire economic policies, 
identified the family as a central institution in 
maintaining society. These classic conservatives 
rejected the notions of equality and individualism in 
enlightenment liberalism, emphasizing instead 
tradition, custom and hierarchy. New Right ideology 
reasserts these ideals, in a backlash against post-1960 
changes in family composition and social values. For 
Canada these changes are indicated by the rising 
number of single parent families, from 7.4% of all 
families in 1971 to 13% in 1991 (Baker 1995:33), the 
doubling of the divorce rate between 1970 and 1985, 
following revisions to the divorce law (Wilson, 
1996:29), and the legalization of homosexuality after 
1969. Another major shift was easier access to 
abortion after legalization in 1969, strengthened by 
the striking down of that law in 1988 (Mandell and 
Duffy 1988:182), and defeat of a new law limiting 
abortion in 1990. Welfare policies such as those 
entitling women to benefits even when they have a 
lover (Baker 1996:40), are seen by the New Right as 
facilitating and legitimizing these changes in social 
practice. 
New Right thinkers advocate instead a return 
to a patriarchal form of family (although the term 
patriarchy is never used), where men are independent 
economic actors and family breadwinners with power 
and authority over their family members (Gittins 
1993:36), while women remain dependent, caring for 
the home and children. In this model women operate 
outside the market, and are not full citizens in their 
own right (Abbott and Wallace 1992:2). This view of 
complementarity between men's and women's roles in 
the family is consistent with functionalist analysis 
popular in social science in the 1950s, which 
bolstered the prevailing ideology and supported and 
justified circumscribed roles for men and women as 
natural and necessary to maintaining a stable society 
(Beechey 1987: 19-25; Hale 1990:326-329). 
A feminist critique of this analysis emerged 
in the 1960s as scholars systematically demonstrated 
"the family" to be socially constructed, revealing the 
middle-class, ethnocentric bias inherent to 
functionalist theory (see Rubin 1976; Coontz 1992; 
Rapp et al. 1979). Women's domestic role, the work 
it entailed and its relationship to the capitalist system, 
in particular the ways unwaged work facilitates the 
operations of capital, was questioned and analysed 
(Seccombe 1974; Delphy 1977). This critique by 
both academic and activist feminists helped make 
way for the legislative and policy changes such as 
those noted above. These permitted the emergence of 
a plurality of family forms and a range of choices for 
individual men and women.4 It is thus hardly 
surprising that those struggling to recapture the 
dominance of the patriarchal family identify 
"feminists" as their main enemy (Adamson et al. 
1988; Eichler 1986; Erwin 1993). 
Dubinsky (1985:33) notes that the strength 
of the New Right derives from its ability to link 
economic conservatism with a return to a 
"traditional" patriarchal family. The precise nature of 
the connection between the two is not always clearly 
explained, although it is vital to understanding why 
neoconservative economic policies require changes in 
thinking about the family. Those promoting a return 
to "family values" identify a breakdown in family 
roles and responsibilities, leading to increased crime, 
sexual deviance and divorce, seen generally as moral 
decline. It is argued that this is accompanied by 
economic decline, as government spends excessively 
on the apparatus of the welfare state and the criminal 
justice system. In a circular fashion dependency on 
the state is reinforced. Thus the balance of 
responsibility between the state, private enterprise 
and family has to be reconfigured. While the welfare 
state's role was to compensate for the inadequacies of 
the capitalist system, this responsibility shifts to the 
family as the welfare state contracts, and the 
patriarchal, self-reliant, nuclear family is re-
established as natural and desirable, efficient and 
functional. As Abbott and Wallace point out :"to stem 
the economic decline of the capitalist countries it is 
necessary to re-moralize them" (1992:7). The 
remainder of the paper then explores one example of 
the processes by which these shifts are being 
accomplished. 
RESTRUCTURING IDENTITIES THROUGH 
NEW CORPORATE AND FAMILIAL 
HEGEMONIES 
Unlike many Hamilton Steelworkers, those 
interviewed still have core sector, full time, unionized 
jobs, the kinds against which emerging non-standard 
jobs are measured, and often seen to fall short. Yet 
while attention is paid to such "new" jobs, what is 
often missed is the way that restructuring challenges 
the meaning of old blue-collar jobs. Once secure in 
their status as family breadwinners, the experience of 
restructuring has shaken the foundations of 
Steelworker identity, as well as that of family 
members and coworkers. 
Kobena Mercer suggests that: 
identity only becomes an issue when it is in 
crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, 
coherent and stable is displaced by the 
experience of doubt and uncertainty . 
(Mercer 1990:43) 
Moreover, an ensuing identity crisis is 
necessarily mediated by the ways people understand 
the objective conditions underlying the crisis. 
To begin to grasp their understanding of the 
situation, it is helpful to draw on Gramsci's idea of a 
hegemonic project. Gramsci's (1971) position is that 
the dominant economic and political forces in a 
society are able to obscure the real material 
conditions which result in class conflict. A broad 
consensus of opinion and belief is diffused 
throughout society and conveyed as being in the 
general interest. In this way acceptance of the 
capitalist system is generated, and any alternative 
system becomes difficult to imagine. 
In her work on restructuring in Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts, June Nash traces the cultural 
construction of corporate hegemony. She argues that 
the defeat of the communist unions in the 1920s and 
30s signaled the weakness of the American labour 
movement, and permitted large corporations to take 
leadership in establishing the dominant patterns for 
industrial organization (Nash 1989). Corporate 
hegemony in Pittsfield has been virtually unresisted 
through the remainder of the century, and Nash 
shows how this effectively obscures the workers' 
position in the global system, and undermines the 
potential for action in defense of their collective 
interests. She tells how during the 1970s and 80s 
managers at the Pittsfield General Electric plant laid 
off workers, while demanding increased productivity 
from those left to keep the plant open. When the 
corporation announced in 1986 that it would close, 
only a few, older workers objected (Nash 1994:22). 
Since World War II corporate hegemony in 
Canada has been bolstered by a stronger social 
contract than in the US, ensuring labour peace and 
continued production, and providing a social safety 
net to protect the working class during economic 
downturns. Before the welfare state the family was 
expected to cushion the impact of economic crisis, 
providing the institutional framework for working 
class survival by pooling and redistributing its 
resources (Hareven 1982). This usually meant that 
women intensified paid and unpaid labour, to absorb 
the shocks of an unstable economy. More recently the 
state has been actively involved in ensuring the 
reproduction of the family and its members (Ursel 
1992), and in the post-war period many important 
social welfare policies have centred on the nuclear 
family. 
Within the hegemonic field of the postwar 
period, with its particular ideas concerning work, the 
family, and the state, people carve out social 
identities as workers and family members. But this is 
also shaped locally in the dynamics of specific actors: 
capitalist enterprises, workers, their organizations and 
families. Restructuring has brought about changes in 
the terms of hegemonic control at both global and 
local levels. As business retreated from the social 
contract through the 1980s, corporate hegemony 
emphasized free trade, competition and mobility. 
Moreover, the state's retreat from providing full 
social welfare to its citizens is accompanied by a new 
common sense ideology promoting reliance on the 
family or self sufficiency. The sense of social and 
cultural fragmentation associated with these major 
changes (Harvey 1989; cf Jameson 1991), is then at 
least partly offset by the hegemonic project of the 
Right as it promotes economic cooperation and a 
return to so-called traditional cultural values. 
MEN AND WOMEN, STEEL AND 
RESTRUCTURING 
On a hot, humid evening in July, sticky and 
damp from the drive, I emerge from my car 
outside the Gray's house in a small town 
outside Hamilton, just as their older and 
somewhat rusty station wagon pulls into the 
driveway. Dad Steve and daughters Sarah 
(14) and Jenny (11) jump out of the car, 
while still inside Mom Sue tries to persuade 
Cory (8) to put his shoes on. They are 
arriving home from Jenny's baseball game 
where Sue has been coaching, the others 
active and vocal spectators. As they leave 
the car, Sarah is commenting on Jenny's 
ability to catch, and they are soon arguing 
hotly. We all tumble into the house, sweaty 
and thirsty, and as the family dog greets us 
enthusiastically the kids disappear towards 
the fridge. The adults retreat to the living 
room to seek refuge from the escalating 
argument, and Steve makes a foray to the 
kitchen for drinks for us, and to try to calm 
the combatants. 
When he returns, drinks in hand, 
Steve says "It's way better now that I'm on 
12 hour shifts. It used to be really hard to be 
involved in anything outside work, and it's 
still difficult to do anything routine." As our 
conversation ranges over work and play, 
home and the steel mill, Steve and Sue share 
their worries about Steve's job security, 
fears of downsizing and the competitive 
market for steel. Sue has worked part-time 
since their youngest was about 3, arranging 
her schedule at first around Steve's shifts, 
relying on their next door neighbour to 
cover odd hours when they were both 
working. Now Sue works at two jobs, but 
has the flexibility to coordinate them 
"around my kids". Their spare time is spent 
mainly socializing with family and some 
close friends. Sue coaches both Jenny's and 
Sarah's baseball teams, which takes up four 
evenings a week. They love to travel and 
have crossed the continent, usually choosing 
destinations where they have family to visit. 
A brief glimpse into Steve and Sue's life in the 
summer of 1994 provides a window on how 
steelworker families perceive and live family and 
work relations. To understand how restructuring is 
reforging identities for steelworkers and their families 
requires first a description of some of the work-
related changes that have affected their lives in the 
last 15 years. 
In the tradition of Hamilton steelworking, 
generations of men have followed family members 
into the mills since mid-19th century. Steve chose 
Stelco over Dofasco (the other major Hamilton steel 
works, which is non-union) because his grandfather 
had worked there, and people at the plant still 
remembered him. Well-paid jobs in the steel mills, 
with a strong union and history of successful strikes, 
provided an incentive to leave school early. The 
masculine culture of the steel mills was shaped in the 
coke ovens and blast furnaces, machine and electrical 
shops, but steelworkers who enjoyed male shopfloor 
culture were often quick to say how much they hated 
the work (Corman et al. 1993:49). This culture was 
challenged in the late 1970s when after a struggle 
women won the right to occupy well-paid 
steelworker jobs, forcing reluctant change in long 
held shopfloor practices (Livingstone and Luxton 
1989). Encountering women in the workplace 
presented an everyday challenge to the construction 
of male steelworker identity, as well as to women's 
identities both at work and in the family. 
In the 1980s, as the steel industry faced 
crisis on a world scale, the workforce at Stelco was 
'downsized', a word which, Steve says, "makes me 
really nervous when I hear [it] on TV". In accordance 
with seniority provisions almost all the women in the 
male-dominated jobs were laid off (Corman et al. 
1993:139), though numerically layoffs affected far 
more men than women, as workers with longer 
seniority lost their positions. In 1981 the average 
seniority was 13 years, by 1989 it was over 20 years 
(Corman et al 1993:35). 
The other side of the coin for steelworker 
families concerns the particular configuration of 
local capital and the relations of power, privilege 
and exploitation that prevailed which allowed male 
steelworkers to earn a "family wage" until the late 
1970s. Steelworkers' wives were thus able to stay 
out of the labour force and live the domestic ideal of 
staying at home to look after their families (Luxton 
and Livingstone 1989). In fact, Hamilton had the 
lowest rates of women's employment in Canada 
from 1945 to 1981 because of high wages in the 
steel industry, as well as patterns of discriminatory 
hiring practices (Corman et al. 1993:263). 
FAMILY MATTERS 
The implications of this contracting labour 
force (both numerically and in terms of diversity) 
are several. Changes in the composition of the 
workforce have increased the average age of a 
steelworker in the 1990s since massive layoffs. At 
45 and with 20 years seniority, Steve was the 
youngest in his shop and could anticipate more years 
of this with little prospect of new hiring in the near 
future. This was not simply an issue for the 'junior' 
in each department, but more generally aging 
steelworkers recognized difficulty performing the 
work of more physical jobs. 
Demographics affected union involvement 
and perceptions of union-management relations as 
well. Workers noted a shift from past steelworker 
militancy to a more cooperative and collaborative 
approach, attributed partly to the aging workforce: 
"when we were young we were more likely to take 
them on". There remained much support for the 
union, and some regret for its recent 
accommodations to management, yet with some 
exceptions workers agreed that the climate for 
labour relations had changed. As one put it "I don't 
think there is anybody, management or labour, that 
can afford a strike". Seccombe and Livingstone 
(1996:157) refer to the "jointness" of the corporate 
project, one that requires both management and 
labour for its success. Steve commented: 
I don't see so much the management-
worker thing anymore. We've got together. 
I think you are in together to do something, 
to make a profit....They seem to be pretty 
tolerant of each other now. You can't do 
something if you are fighting with someone 
all the time. You're losing track of what 
you are there to do.... 
Companies and unions have to 
work together. I think the day of ranting 
and raving and standing outside with a 
placard is over. You have to to sit down 
and talk seriously. 
Most steelworkers interviewed were unequivocal 
about giving teachers the right to strike, because 
"everyone should have a voice," and there was 
overwhelming support for the recently adopted NDP 
anti-scab legislation. There was slightly more 
equivocation from their wives on both of these 
issues. 
Like Sue and Steve, every family had 
children living at home. Family activities structured 
leisure time and time spent with me. The Grays 
talked about family holidays driving in Canada and 
the United States, usually to visit family, attend 
family weddings and sightsee. Though costly, such 
trips were anticipated with excitement and fondly 
recalled. 
Parents expressed concern about college 
expenses and their childrens' job prospects. Sue 
said "I feel sorry for my kids, I don't know what's 
in store for them. A huge deficit. You have to have 
an education or you get nothing. And even when 
you do have an education chances are you still could 
get nothing." Employment equity policies were 
criticized for the direct and negative impact on their 
sons' futures. 
While many had identified with the NDP in 
the past, they now considered alternatives, some 
moving relatively far to the right. After four years in 
office and the very bumpy passage of the Social 
Contract, the NDP was unpopular with both its long 
and short term supporters, and its defeat in the 
imminent election was expected. Steve, who had 
voted Liberal in the past, revealed his vote "for 
Preston Manning" in the federal election, rather to 
his wife's surprise. 
The debate over spousal benefits for same 
sex couples, which was a hot issue on the political 
agenda at the time, was often raised. Spousal 
benefits extend the social wage associated with 
individual employment into the family, but rely on 
a societal norm of a nuclear, heterosexual family. 
There was little support for the government's 
position in favour of benefits, and during the 
fieldwork period the N D P amended the bill to 
restrict adoption. One man argued: "I don't think 
they have a right to be recognized as a family 
because they're not a family the way I perceive a 
family". This kind of view was echoed in the 
Spectator, where provincial Liberal leader Lyn 
McLeod was quoted as saying "For me it goes 
beyond the extension of sick leave and health leave 
benefits to give adoption rights and change the 
traditional definition of family. That's not something 
I can support" (Hamilton Spectator June 1 1994: 
A3). At about the same time a C T V news poll 
concluded that "we still like 2-parent heterosexual 
families" (Hamilton Spectator June 13: A3), a view 
consistent with the actual composition of the families 
interviewed. Three couples had split up during the 
10 year period, and two of the men had remarried. 
Five out of six letters published on June 1 1994 
concerning the so-called same sex bill were against 
the principle. 
Lax government policies were perceived as 
partly responsible for the large number of "welfare 
bums". People said they objected to the government 
"handing money over to people who refuse to work 
or even try and work" and of "everybody getting a 
free handout...". Late in July a number of 
newspaper articles discussed the opposition's 
investigation of welfare and health care fraud. Steve 
commented: "I realize there has to be welfare for 
people that are in situations. But I see abuse of the 
system, that's the part that annoys me." 
In the space of a few years corporate 
restructuring has reconstituted a remarkably 
homogeneous workforce of white, middle-aged men, 
making a "good" steelworker wage, and facing 
similar family responsibilities. One man observed 
that "just about everyone has a mortgage to worry 
about." Yet any complacency which might have 
acccompanied settling in to middle-age and middle-
class5 life is eliminated by fears about job security. 
While some workers had dealt with a recurring 
pattern of layoff and recall for years, and knew the 
cycle of uncertainty well, others considered even 
their regular year-round jobs in jeopardy, since at 
any moment the company could "bring in a machine 
that'll wipe out a thousand jobs and they don't care". 
In addition to their main job many men had taken 
training in a new field, some beginning during a 
strike, others as a strategy in anticipation of layoff. 
A few had set up a micro business "on the 
side", usually run with the help of family (mainly 
wives') labour. The faith that the steel industry 
would provide a job for life that prevailed when they 
entered the mill 20 years ago has been painfully 
shattered as they saw their coworkers being laid off. 
Eleven of the seventeen wives had not 
worked after having children, but financial insecurity 
had led ten of these to assume at least a part-time job 
during the 1980s, as did Sue. Economic vulnerability 
was very real, despite acknowledging that they were 
better off than many. One woman remarked "it 
wouldn't take much for us to go under, really". 
Most wives had worked first as a temporary measure 
during their husband's lay off or strike, but the 
income had become a regular part of the family 
budget. This represents a major shift from the 
traditional single breadwinner family characterizing 
steelworkers in the recent past. 
The change from the breadwinner norm was 
not taken lightly. Women described how they had 
expected to stay home with their kids, but financial 
pressures had forced them to find a job. Men and 
women sometimes saw these jobs as a source of 
disruption and loss of family rhythm. Considering 
her daughters' futures, Sue lamented "They probably 
won't have the chance to stay home with their 
families that I did, because I can see things are just 
going to be too expensive. They can't afford a one 
income family. I don't think that's healthy in the 
long run". Along with a large number of the wives 
(and many of the husbands), Sue expressed 
disapproval of working women such as one she knew 
who: 
drops the baby off at 7.30 in the morning. 
I can't understand that. I wouldn't know 
how I would cope with dropping a child 
off, it's a baby. You know, winter dark, 
she picks her up I think around 5 pm. I 
think that's just the way it's going to be all 
the time. So who is raising their kids? Day 
cares and babysitters but that's not you. 
While the general principle of equal 
opportunity for women was supported by 
steelworker families in the 1984 study (Luxton and 
Livingstone 1989), ten years later blame for 
continuing gender struggles was often firmly placed 
in the hands of "feminists". Feminists were seen by 
some as having "gone too far" in their demands for 
equality. As one man stated, "I think the feminist 
movement has been detrimental. There's been some 
good points to it but I think not all of it has been 
good." Another man described himself as "not one 
of those equality nuts.. .a woman shouldn't say, well, 
I should have that job because I'm a woman which 
is happening right now the way they have the law all 
made out with this equity stuff". These sentiments 
were not only expressed by men. A woman 
remarked "I think sometimes the feminists have gone 
too far, that they've really gone radical some of 
them, and they haven't made anything better." 
Yet at the same time that this negative view 
of feminism was expressed verbally, its power is 
undermined by the changes in the sexual division of 
labour that had taken place in most households 
during the 10 year period. Men now expected to be 
called upon to cook suppers, take care of children, 
and perform housework, and usually did it willingly. 
Although there were contradictory reports of the 
amount of time men spent in housework, and the 
degree to which decision making was a truly shared 
responsibility (cf. Luxton 1990), there seems to be 
no doubt that there had been a shift towards greater 
equality within individual households. There was 
often joking between couples about domestic tasks, 
especially laundry: 
Steve: Basically whatever has to be done, 
has to be done. If there is laundry down 
there... 
Sue: (Laughing) No, you're not 
supposed to touch the laundry 
Steve: Well you don't like the way I do 
the laundry, but I don't do a bad job. 
Sue: But he did dishes, he set my son 
vacuuming while I was out this morning. 
They neatened up the house while I was 
gone. 
Steve: We are fairly flexible. I mean, if 
the grass needs cutting Sue wil l do it. The 
laundry needs doing, I ' l l do it. 
Yet a double standard still pertained, as Sue points 
out: 
Even with Steve, he does a lot around the 
house, but what he does when he comes 
home from work is he eats his food, he sits 
in front of the T V and reads the newspaper. 
I can't do that. I can't come home from 
work and sit and grab the newspaper and 
expect that my meal is going to be sitting in 
front of me. 
A BATTLE ON TWO FRONTS: AT WORK 
AND IN T H E FAMILY 
Reflecting on these observations the 
precariousness of production relations, which has led 
to an intensification of work activities on all fronts, 
was quite striking. Equally striking, however, was 
the way the politics of family kept emerging, 
whether it was the micropolitics of everyday family 
life, or the broader politics of homosexual rights, 
welfare entitlement, daycare, and divorce. 
In his analysis of Thatcherism, Stuart Hall 
(1988) argues that New Right ideology relies on a 
two-pronged approach. The first is to accomplish the 
economic project of neoconservatism, but the 
inevitable result of this is to render economic life 
expectations for the majority extremely unstable and 
insecure. To combat that insecurity, the second 
feature is then brought into play. This involves 
reconstituting the idea of family, as the crucible of 
moral values, hard work and based on traditional 
gender roles (During 1993:14). While the material 
reality disrupts peoples' lives, New Right ideology 
obscures the contradiction between labour market 
flexibility and family values. 
Thatcher's views on the family are illustrated 
by quotes such as this one: 
The family and its maintenance really is the 
most important thing not only in your 
personal life, but in the life of any 
community, because this is the unit on 
which the whole nation is built. (Margaret 
Thatcher 1989, cited in Rutherford 
1990:12). 
Family and nation are intended here to 
signify the nuclear, heterosexual family, and white, 
"English" nation. Thatcherism consciously played on 
the idea of the "enemies within" - "others" in both 
sexual and racial terms (During 1993:14). 
Homophobic ideas, for example, clearly shape and 
are shaped by both the contemporary demands of 
capital and the state. For example, one way that the 
state meets its apparent need to dismantle social 
welfare programmes is by establishing categories 
(such as homosexuals) of those who do not deserve 
assistance. 
Typically, the right wing neoconservative 
agenda in Canada has been adopted in a low key and 
fairly unobtrusive fashion. Carroll and Ratner 
(1989:35) argue that the absence of a national 
working class culture tenaciously in contention with 
bourgeois hegemony (as it was in Britain), together 
with the federal state's capacity to displace 
responsibility for crisis to the provincial level, has 
resulted in a "low-profile passive revolution". The 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States 
and the N A F T A brought the economic debate into 
public discourse, but the anti Free Trade forces were 
weak during the federal election of 1988, and this 
election laid the groundwork for securing the deal. 6 
It is consistent with Hall's framework for 
understanding this transformation that while this 
"passive revolution" in the economic sphere was 
taking place in the 1980s, forces were being 
marshalled to promote a return to the "traditional 
family". This struggle coalesced in Canada around 
R E A L women, a so-called pro-family movement, 
committed to "family values" and openly fighting a 
feminist agenda. Their work centred on abortion, 
women in the workforce, the social devaluation of 
the housewife, and rights for gays and lesbians 
(Erwin 1993:406). In the political arena the 
Confederation of Regions Party unveiled a platform 
in 1994 supporting "a return to basics in education, 
support for family values and Canadian heritage and 
traditions" (Hamilton Spectator May 24 1994 B l ) . 
Both the federal Reform Party and the Ontario 
Conservatives have explicitly linked family and 
economy, telling Canadians to rely less on the state 
for support in the future, and more on their families. 
Reflecting on the political consciousness of 
workers and their families in Massachusetts, Nash 
compared them to mining families she had known in 
Bolivia. She saw the American workers "retreating 
into privatized misery rather than, as the miners of 
Bolivia, protesting publicly the lack of responsibility 
of the mining corporation" (Nash 1994:23). The 
vigour with which steelworker families throw 
themselves into family activities reflects the 
importance of and reliance on family in times of 
economic insecurity. It also reflects the success of 
the hegemonic process in conveying the message that 
solutions to problems should be sought within the 
family rather than in the political sphere through 
class struggle.7 
The success of the New Right lies not 
simply in its ideological constructs, but has a 
material basis, demonstrated in Thatcher's Britain, 
for example, by rising real wages, increased home 
ownership and tax cuts (Sparks 1996:95). In Ontario 
in 1994 the parties of the Right promised private 
sector job creation and benefits from privatization, 
and the Conservative party was already promising a 
30 per cent tax cut if elected.8 This resonated with 
Steve's feeling that "eventually you have to stand up 
and say enough is enough, I'm paying too much." 
The success of the New Right results from 
the successful interpellation of this segment of the 
working class by ideologies of self-sufficiency, 
traditional family values, smaller government and 
the free market. State intervention inhibits self-
sufficiency, as another steelworker noted: 
You just try to live your life and yet it 
always seems there's some politician or 
somebody stepping in the way, saying well 
no you can't do that no more. 
Moreover, workers used the discourse of free trade 
when discussing the company's actions: 
If you are going to stay in business you're 
going to have to be cost competitive, you're 
going to have to have a good quality 
product. 
Yet the ideology of the dominant class 
expressed in such a comment, combines with what 
Gramsci called common sense, which derives from 
direct life experiences, and results in a contradictory 
class consciousness (Seccombe and Livingstone 
1996:150-151). Qualitative research can reveal the 
contradictions in peoples' thinking and practices, and 
is important in political terms for pointing to the 
spaces potentially open to counterhegemonic 
strategies. While steelworkers comfortably use the 
discourse of free enterprise and competitiveness, 
they still call upon their trade union history to help 
define their values, leading to difficulties in 
reconciling contesting points of view. One 
steelworker agreed that Canadian companies should 
be required to invest in Canada rather than being 
free to invest where they please, but argued that this 
should be self-regulated rather than monitored by 
government. 
During the election campaign in Ontario all 
parties placed economic competitiveness first, and 
none was willing, through promoting same sex 
benefits, to fight for a more inclusive definition of 
family. Mercer (1990:53) argues that the Right has 
been successful in monopolizing what he calls "the 
imaginary horizon of the future", appropriating the 
future exclusively to themselves, and relegating the 
Left and its preoccupation with class to the past. To 
claim a role in the future, old parties of the Left, 
like the Ontario NDP, have moved further to the 
right but in so doing have virtually closed the 
counterhegemonic space they could provide. 
In this political context and fearing for the 
future, it is not surprising that there has been a shift 
towards attitudes of apparent self-interest. These 
indicate the effectiveness of the new corporate and 
familial hegemonies while at the same time revealing 
places where people's agency counterposes the 
apparent seamlessness of new ideologies. 
Steelworker families adopt the neoconservative 
economic arguments which may protect their 
company in an unstable industry. They modify their 
union militancy while holding fast to seniority rights 
and the anti-scab law to protect their jobs, and they 
continue to cherish many traditional labour 
movement values. At the same time they turn to 
exclusive, sharply defined views of family which 
may protect their jobs by maintaining married 
women in a secondary economic role, and may 
protect their access to the shrinking social safety net. 
It is hardly surprising that among Hamilton 
steelworker families, for whom the breadwinner 
family has been the norm within recent experience, 
New Right views of the family are relatively easily 
and comfortably embraced. But there is also 
recognition that many women have no choice but to 
work, and that the welfare state is an important 
corrective to the free market, views that may be 
based in the labour politics that have shaped their 
lives so importantly in the past. These findings 
emphasizes the partiality of the acceptance of New 
Right thinking, and the importance of culture and 
history to the ways in which processes of economic 
restructuring are apprehended. 
Stuart Hall argues that: "what Thatcherism 
as an ideology does is to address the fears, anxieties, 
the lost identities of a people" (Hall 1988:167). It is 
not accidental that Thatcher explicitly called for a 
return to Victorian values. For one thing it evoked 
a return to a glorious imperial past, when Britain 
was truly "Great", but it is worth remembering as 
well that the Victorian era saw the most profound 
insecurity and disruption in production relations, 
now matched in intensity by the conditions facing 
people in the late 20th century. In Victorian times 
this dramatic state of uncertainty implicitly relied on 
an ideology of domesticity to provide a stable 
structure to a society which was otherwise in 
dramatic and potentially dangerous flux. 
What needs to be stressed is the way that 
the ideologies and practices of the Victorian era, 
while serving middle-class males relatively well, 
"secured the interests of capitalism and patriarchy at 
the expense of the working class, of women and of 
children" (Abbott and Wallace 1992:6). As feminist 
scholars and activists systematically document the 
impact of neoconservative policies and practices on 
women, men and children, families and 
communities, they will continue to be in contention 
with those who advocate a return to the "natural" 
social order. 
ENDNOTES 
1. In this paper I use the term neoconservative to describe economic policies and practices and New Right to describe the political 
movement which embraces neoconservatism and incorporates conservative social and moral values. As Abbott and Wallace (1992:2) note, 
this should not imply that there is any single, cohesive New Right ideology. 
2. I use the term "family" here, conscious that in popular usage it conflates discourse, ideology and actual gendered social relations, 
which need to be separated out analytically, while still recognizing that they are mutually constituting. 
3. This fieldwork was funded by a University of Guelph New Faculty Research Grant and was the latest phase in a longitudinal study, 
the Hamilton Families Project, carried out by June Corman, David Livingstone, Meg Luxton and Wally Seccombe and funded by a SSHRC 
grant. I would like to thank the original investigators for generously permitting me access to their data and to the families I interviewed. 
Thanks also to Glynis George, Wally Seccombe and an anonymous reviewer for their very helpful comments on this paper. 
In the original study 200 steelworker families were surveyed in 1983 with an extensive questionnaire, and of these 40 were 
selected for an in-depth follow-up interview in 1984. In 1994 I attempted to re-establish contact with those families who had been 
interviewed, to discover what had happened to them during the intervening 10 years in which Stelco had laid off about 30 percent of its 
workforce. The present sample comprises 18 Steelworker families and one single man living alone. Only three men no longer worked 
for Stelco: one was employed in another industrial job, the two others were self-employed, but had left Stelco voluntarily. Each was 
interviewed once between May and August 1994. Seven of the seventeen couples were interviewed together. In one the wife was 
interviewed alone. 
4. This is not to say that such choices are not constrained by, for example, the principle of compulsory heterosexual ity. 
5. When asked to identify their own social class, informants invariably called themselves middle class. See Livingstone and Mangan 1996. 
6. This is not to argue the absence of considerable popular anti-Free Trade activity since 1988. The point is that its ineffectiveness during 
the 1988 federal election campaign permitted the signing of the free trade agreements, which form the foundation for neoconservative 
policy (economic, cultural, environmental, social, etc.) for the foreseeable future. 
7. Crabbe and Hanson (1994) point out how the New Right ideology of keeping family problems private and away from the interventionist 
state conveniently coincides with opening up the market to privatized services in medicine, old age care, child care, etc. which is consistent 
with the direction of privatization in Ontario. 
8. It is significant that this was the most commonly referred to Progressive Conservative campaign issue in the local newspaper over the 
4 month summer period, along with the views of political opponents. See for example "Harris's election goodies criticized as 'unrealistic'" 
(Spectator May 4 A9). 
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